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COMMENTS 473
PROGRESS OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Since 1919, when the first general statutes were passed in this
country authorizing courts to render declaratory judgments, con-
siderable progress has been made in the employment of'this mode
of relief. Though new in name, the courts had for years been
rendering declaratory judgments in specific types of cases; the
new legislation merely extended the relief to new classes of cases
in which it seemed of practical importance to remove uncertainty
from legal relations or to simplify issues. Some nineteen states!
have now adopted the new procedure, and a sufficient number of
cases have come before the higher courts to warrant some com-
ment upon its development. The vicissitudes experienced by the
declaratory procedure in the United States exhibit marked differ-
ences from its history in other countries. The reluctance of
many courts to follow the experience of England, but rather to be
guided by their own preconceptions as to the limitations of the
judicial function in granting coercive relief, have hampered the
growth and utility of the new remedy in the United States.
The first setback to the new procedure came with the determi-
nation of the Michigan Supreme Court in the Aizvay case,2 that
the Act was unconstitutional on the ground, gratuitously and un-
warrantably assumed, that it imposed on the courts non-judicial
duties in that it required the courts to decide moot cases, give
advisory opinions, and render judgments in cases not actual or
real and judgments that could not be enforced. Not a single com-
mentator appears to have agreed with the majority of the Michi-
gan Court,3 and since then the constitutionality of the Act has been
'Reference is omitted to some earlier spasmodic recourse to the declara-
tory judgment, in California in 1850, in Rhode Island in 1870, and in New
Jersey in 1915. See the writer's comment in (1924) 18 AM. POL. Sc. RE-v.
305. The case stated by adversary parties for an opinion under R. I. Pub.
Laws, 1876, ch. 563, sec. 16, is only partly analogous to a declaratory judg-
ment, for both parties must concur in the petition. The states or terri-
tories which have adopted a more extended form of statute are Florid,
Laws, 1919, ch. 7857 (No. 75) ; Michigan, Pub. Acts, 1919, No. 150, p. 278;
Wiscosin, Laws,. 1919, ch. 242, sec. 2GS7m, p. 253, repealed in 1923, Laws,
ch. 440; New York, 1920, C. P. A., sec. 473; Conzecticut, Acts, 1921, ch. 258;
Kansas, Acts, 1921, ch. 168; California, Sts., 1921, ch. 4G3, Code of Civ.
Proc., secs. 1060-1062; Hawaii, Laws, 1921, ch. 162; Kentucky, Acts, 1922,
ch. 83; Vrirginia, Acts, 1922, ch. 517; South Carolina, Stats. at L. 1922, ch.
542. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, approved in 1922, has been
adopted practically unchanged by Pemnsylvania, Laws, 1923, ch. 321; Ten-
nessee, Acts, 1923, ch. 29; Colorado, Acts, 1923, ch. 98; Wyomig, Acts,
1923, ch. 50; North, Dakota, Acts, 1923, ch. 237; New Jersey, Pub. Laws,
1924, p. 312; Utah, Laws, 1925, p. 40; South Dakota, Laws, 1925, ch. 24,
p. 230.
2 Anvway v. Granul Rapids Ry. (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350,
(1921) 12 A. L. R. 26, 62.
3 See comments in (1920) 19 MICH. L. REV. 8; (1920) 00 YALE LAW
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assumed in several states and has been expressly asserted in con-
sidered opinions by the highest courts of Kansas, California,
Tennessee and Pennsylvania, 4 the two last decisions passing upon
the Uniform Act. Practically all these courts take special pains
to point out the errors and misconceptions of the Michigan court
in the Anway case, and it may be hoped that that court may yet,
in a new case, become convinced of its mistake. The latest deci-
sion on the question is that of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Kariher's Petition, No. 1 (1925, Pa.) 131 Atl. 265,
in which Chief Justice von Moschzisker enters into an ex-
haustive analysis of all the arguments advanced for and
against the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment. He
points out that the judgment is final, that judgments are none the
less final though they may not be executed or executable, provided
they conclusively determine the legal relations of the parties, that
declaratory judgments differ essentially and fundamentally from
advisory opinions or moot cases, and that while no breach of duty,
accomplished or threatened, is necessary to invoke the declaratory
judgment, it does require evidence of uncertainty or doubt or a
cloud on rights, which, in an adversary proceeding, it serves a
practical, useful purpose to remove. When such a practical pur-
pose will not, in the court's opinion, be served, it has discretion to
decline to render a declaratory judgment.
Perhaps it was this element of judicial discretion which per-
suaded the Pennsylvania court in a previous case, to suggest, by
way of dictum, that the declaratory action could only be employed
when no ordinary form of action was available and that the main
purpose of the declaratory procedure was to insure a speedy de-
termination of issues "which would otherwise be delayed, to the
possible injury of those interested, if they were compelled to await
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings". It is believed that
nothing in the history of declaratory procedure justifies such a
conclusion. While in some cases, before injury has been done, it
may be the sole recourse of a party seeking the determination of
his rights; on the other hand, it is frequently only an alternative
remedy, by which a party may seek, not his most drastic or
extreme remedy-damages, injunction or other coercive relief-
JOURNAL, 161; (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 168; (1922) 4 ILL. L. QUART. 126;
(1920) 6 A. B. A. JouR. 145; (1921) 7 ibid. 141; (1922) 7 CoRN. L. QUART.
255; also Rice in (1921) 28 W. VA. L. QUART. 1; and Schoonmaker in (1921)
5 MiNN. L. Rnv. 172.
4 Kansas, State ex rel. Hopkins v. GrovJ (1921) 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac.
82, (1922) 19 A. L. R. 1124; California, Blakeslee v. Wilson (1923) 190
Calif. 479, 213 Pac. 495, (1923) 8 IowA L. BUL. 272; Tennessee, Miller v.
Miller (1923) 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965; Pennsylvania, Karihers Peti.
tion No. 1 (1925, Pa.) 131 AtI. 265.
SIn re List's Estate (1925, Pa.) 129 Atl. 64.
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but the milder declaration of his rights, which will fully satisfy
his requirements. He may prefer for many reasons the amicable
methods of judicial arbitration of conflicting views of the law and
the clarification of uncertainty in legal relations to a hostile cam-
paign in the full panoply of judicial war. Why compel the latter
when the former suffices? So the court of Hawaii is believed to
have erred in refusing to try by declaratory action the conflicting
claims of title to office by two sets of officials in a fraternal society,
compelling the case to be fought out in a quo warranto proceed-
ing.c The mere fact that the wrongful act complained of had
already been committed, and that another form of remedy was
therefore available, was no legitimate ground for declining to
decide the rights of the parties by a declaratory judgment. To
conceive of the declaratory procedure as if it were an eyxtraordi-
nary legal remedy like mandamus, not grantable when an ordi-
nary remedy is available, involves a serious mistake. Much of
the purpose of the Act would be defeated by restricting it to such
exceptional cases; there is no justification for the restriction in
history or precedent. While speed of adjudication of a crucial,
segregated issue may often prove one of the decided advantages of
the declaratory procedure, it is by no means the main purpose of
the relief. It is not believed to be correct, therefore, to decline the
relief merely because it would not lead to a speedier determina-
tion than some existing procedure affords.7
The Michigan decision had another unfortunate effect. With
a view to avoiding what that court mistakenly deemed to be the
defect of the Michigan Act in requiring the courts to render
judgment in abstract or academic or moot cases, a few other
states, as well as the draftsmen of the proposed federal Act, in
the laudable desire to save the constitutionality of their statutes,
prefixed to the grant of power conferred on the courts the phrase,
"in cases of actual controversy". They were strengthened in
their belief in the advisability of this precaution, by the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in the Muskrat case. In fact, how-
ever, the precaution was entirely unnecessary, for courts have not
rendered and should not render declaratory judgments in cases
that do not present the elements of an adverse proceeding, vhere
the determination will not remove uncertainty or settle a contro-
versy, immediate or incipient. Nobody thought of conferring
upon th6 courts power to decide imaginary, academic or moot
cases, and it was gratuitous to suppose that the Michigan Act
required the court to decide such cases. The danger is, and to
some extent it already has been incurred, that courts will give
6Kaldkau v. HaU (1923) 27 Haw. 420.
: See In re Lists Estate, supra note 5, at 65.
8 Muskrat v. United States (1911) 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
too narrow a construction to the words "actual controversy" and
will demand a fully ripe litigation as a condition of a declaratory
action. 9 That would be to defeat much of the efficacy of the de-
claratory judgment, for, as Judge von Moschzisker says in Kari.
her's Petition No. 1, the tribunal must be satisfied that "an actual
controversy or the ripening seeds of one" exists. What is really
meant is that a potential controversy must be involved, the settle-
ment of which can be aided by a removal of uncertainty through
the determination and declaration of presently existing rights.
When the Uniform Act, which omits the ambiguous phrase, states
that "the court may decline to declare rights in any case where a
decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy
which gave rise to the action", it assumes that the removal of un-
certainty, the quieting of title or of legal relations generally, is
an important function of the Act. The danger is that by a nar-
row construction of the word "actual" much of this beneficent
function may in the United States be lost. If the experience of
England were more frequently invoked in the interpretation of
the American statutes such danger would be minimized.
There is also a tendency discernible when the court finds that
a declaration should not be issued in the case before it, to gener-
alize the conclusion by asserting that none can be issued in such
cases; that is, instead of merely denying the declaration sought,
to say that the court has no jurisdiction.'
9 Shearer v. Backer (1925) 207 Ky. 455, 269 S. W. 543 (whether certain
restrictions on alienation' had expired and other questions which would have
removed uncertainty); Axton v. Goodman (1924) 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W.
806. In the latter case a declaration was sought that the Progressive
Party had the privilege of appointing challengers and inspectors at elec-
tions. Though the defendant, the attorney general, had denied the privi-
lege, and an issue was thus made, the court refused the declaration on the
ground that defendants had no "rights" or "duties" to perform. The court
thought there was no "actual controversy". This is believed to be an error.
Possibly, however, there was no error in the same conclusion reached in
West v. City of Wichita (1925, Kan.) 234 Pac. 978, where the plaintiff
sought to have a zoning ordinance declared invalid, but did not state
specifically enough the purpose for which he desired to use his property.
But in Kelly v. Jackson (1925) 206 Ky. 815, 268 S. W. 539, it ought not to
have been necessary to hold the local election in question, to enable plain-
tiffs to secure a declaration, had their privilege been denied, that they were
privileged to vote in it, the question being practical. There is doubt, how-
ever, whether the declaration sought was specifically enough framed and
whether the asserted privilege was questioned by anybody. Yet, as already
observed, if the litigation is fully ripe, some courts will on that account
deny the declaratory judgment. Kaleikau v. Hall, supra note 6. These
courts would confine the relief to exceptional cases, where no other remedy
is possible.
10 Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co. (1925, N. J.) 129 Atl. 617; of. Joy Co.
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The declaration must of course be sought in the proper court,
law or equity.1 Under the Uniform Act and most of the other
Acts all courts, within their respective jurisdictions, have power
to render declaratory judgments.
Declarations have in recent state cases been successfully sought
in the following classes of cases: the construction of wills,'1 trust
deeds,13 statutes and ordinances4 and the powers of statutory
public bodies thereunder ;': the powers and privileges conferred
by corporate charters or by-laws ;113 the construction of contracts,
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 794, 120 Atl. 634 (declara-
tion issued). This was the error of the Michigan court in the Anway case,
supra note 2. Defendants are sometimes impleaded, not because the plain-
tiff can have relief against them, but because they may be in a position to
dispute the plaintiff's claim. In fact, the failure to cite such a potential
defendant caused a denial of the declaration in a partition suit in Kentuchy.
Ezzell x. Exall (1925) 207 Ky. 615, 269 S. W. 752.
21 Paterson v. Currier (1925, N. J. Eq.) 129 Atl. 711 (questioned title to
real estate under a will should have been raised in the law, not chancery,
court). That the question must be raised in a court having juris-
diction, see In re Gooding's Will (1924, Surro. Ct.) 124 Misc. 400, 203 N.
Y. Supp. 793. Declaration as to validity of a bond issue will not be made
where the question has already been determined in the federal courts and
where, under the circumstances, it seems undesirable. State r. Board of
Commissioners of Wyandotte County (1924, Kan.) 230 Pac. 531.
'_-Miller v. Miller, supra note 4; In re List's Estate, supra note 5; Bra-
mn v. Babcock (1923) 93 Conn. 549, 120 AtI. 150 (identification of plaintiff
as designated legatee-power assumed, but declaration declined because
the land was in another state). Maresi et aL v. United Statc Trust Co.
(1926, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) N. Y. L. Joun., Jan. 5, 1926.
-- In re Devlin's Trust Estate (1925) 284 Pa. 11, 130 AtL 238.
14 Kelly v. Jackson (1925) supra note 9 (whether it was lawful for cattle
to run at large); Board of Education r. Van Zandt (1922, Sup. Ct. Spec.
T.) 119 Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297, aff'd (1922, 4th Dept.) 204 App.
Div. 856, 197 N. Y. Supp. 899, aff'd (1923) 234 N. Y. 644, 138 N. E. 481
(construction of taxing power); State cx rel Hop:ins v. Grove, supra note
4 (that defendant was ineligible to certain public office). Niebuhr v. Fitch
(1925, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) N. Y. L. Joum Nov. 25, 1925 p. 789 (that claimants,
as next of kin of deceased husband, were entitled, under Decedents' Estates
Law, to take personalty left by his deceased widow); Ware r. Ammon
(1925, Ky. Ct. of App., decided Dec. 18, 1925, declaring void a statute
regulating the dry cleaning business.)
15 Craig v. Commissioners of Sing Fund (1924, 1st Dept.) 203 App.
Div. 412, 203 N. Y. Supp. 236 (that Controller's presence was necessary to
action of Board); Path6 Exchange v. Cobb (1922, 3d Dept.) 202 App. Div.
450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661 (that "news reel" was not subject to censorship) ;
State v. Wooster (1922) 111 Kan. 830, 203 Pac. 65G (povers of state board
of education); State v. Kansas City (1922) 110 Kan. 603, 204 Pac. 690
(power of city to issue bonds).
16 United Order of Foresters v. Miller (1922) 178 Wis. 299, 190 N. W. 197
(fraternal society, rights of policy-holders) ; Lchmaicr v. Bedford (1923) 99
Conn. 468, 121 Atl. 810 (hospital association, voting privileges of directors).
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either before or after breach, 7 including leases 8 and the legal
relations of the parties thereto; and the trial of claims to the
enjoyment of property, real or personal."'
The enactment of the federal statute would doubtless give con-
siderable impetus to the movement for the employment of this
remedy; and as the bench and bar become more familiar with it,
it is likely to be availed of with increasing frequency. Neverthe-
less, in spite of the warm approval expressed by certain courts,
the reluctance of others to give the remedy as wide a scope as do




CAMPBELL v. HOLT-A RULE OR AN EXCEPTION?
In the recent case of William Danzer & Co. Inc. v. Gulf & S. I.
Ry. (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 612, the question is again raised of
the constitutionality of the revival by legislation of a right of
action barred by the running of a statute of limitations. It is
17 Manhattan Bridge Three Cont Line v. City of New York (1922, 2d
Dept.) 204 App. Div. 89, 198 N. Y. Supp. 49 (renewal privilege under exist-
ing franchise); Durant v. Whedon (1922, 3d Dept.) 201 App. Div. 196, 194
N. Y. Supp. 126 (privileges accompanying contract for sale of newspaper);
Joy Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., supra note 10 (plaintiff's contract
liability to defendant, depending on subcontractor's liability to lienors, de-
termined) ; Blakeslee v. Wilson, supra note 4 (rights under contract of
employment); Proctor v. Avondale Heights Co. (1923) 200 Ky. 447, 255
S. W. 81 (power to convey certain lots reserved for parks); Mayor of
Bayonne v. East Jersey Water Co. (1919, N. J. Eq.) 108 Atl. 121 (rights
under contract for future supply of water decided under Act of 1915).
18 Aaron v. Woodcock (1925) 283 Pa. 33, 128 At. 665; Kariher's Petition
No. 1, supra note 4 (power of lessor to make lease); see also Hyde v.
Blaxter (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 299 Fed. 167 (referring to lease construed
by Kansas court) and Sarner v. Kantor (1925, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Misc.
469, 205 N. Y. Supp. 760 (dictum that proper way to determine that land-
lord's consent to subletting was unreasonably withheld was by declaratory
judgment). On the point in the latter case, see leading case of Young ',.
Ashley Gardens Properties, Ltd. [1903] 2 Ch. 112.
19 Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Walter (1924, Colo.) 226 Pac. 864 (up-
holding plaintiff's right to exclusive use of certain waters rising on his
land). Baumann v. Naugle (1925, N. J. Eq.) 127 Atl. 263 (declaratory
judgment that plaintiff's mortgage did not constitute a valid lien on certain
land, involved in complicated real estate transaction-the judgment had
been previously refused under the narrower New Jersey Act of 1915, P. L.
1915, ch. 116, sec. 7). Renwick v. Hay (1919) 90 N. J. Eq. 148, 106 At].
547 (respective rights of parties in a private right of way decided under
Act of 1915).
20 Many courts, notably those of Connecticut and New York, now take the
new form of action for granted, and do not especially refer to it in their
opinions. For that reason, the digesters often fail to refer to the fact that
the action was declaratory in form, and the bar thus frequently overlooks
procedural precedents thereby created.
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provided by the Interstate Commerce Act, that .complaints under
the Act must be filed with the Commission within two years of
the accrual of the claim. The Transportation Act of 19202
specifies that the period of federal control of the railroads (1917-
1920) shall not be counted in computing the period of limitation
as to claims arising prior to federal control. The claim in the
instant case arose in 1917 prior to federal control and was barred
before the passage of the Transportation Act. The complaint
was ified with the Commission in 1921, and the claimant brought
suit to recover the award allowed by the Commission. The de-
fendant demurred on the ground that the Transportation Act was
unconstitutional if it attempted to revive claims to the Commis-
sion previously barred. The demurrer was sustained. The Su-
preme Court affirmed this judgment on the ground that since the
right of action and the period of limitation thereon were created
by the same statute, the right was destroyed with the lapse of
the limitation period and that a new remedy given by statute on
these facts would involve a taking of the defendant's property
without due process of law.2
Where a right of action relates to specific land or chattels it has
never been doubted, in modern times, that adverse possession for
the statutory period gives the adverse holder an "indefeasible
title",4 and that to allow the prior possessor a new right of action
would clearly be unconstitutional.5 As to rights of action other
than those relating to land or chattels, however, some courts have
held revival to be constitutional., In the fields of pleading- and
I Act of Feb. 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 379) as amended by Act of June 18,
1910 (36 Stat. at L. 539, 551, 554).
2 Act of Feb. 28, 1920, sec. 206f (41 Stat. at L. 450, 462).
3 Section 206f of the Transportation Act, supra note 2, was first held to
revive barred actions. Stazdley v. United States R. R. Adrnin. (1920,
N. D. Ohio) 271 Fed. 794; Hoagland v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. (1922)
195 Ky. 257, 242 S. W. 628. The Supreme Court denied such revival but
avoided the constitutional question by basing its decision on the failure to
find a legislative intent to revive. Fudlrtoz-Krulwgcr Lbr. Co. -e. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. (1925) 266 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct 143. Counsel in the princi-
pal case pointed out that as all claims to the Commission referred to in
sec. 206f of the Act were barred before the passage of this section, the in-
tent necessarily was to revive them. Such intended effect was held un-
constitutional in the instant case.
4 Shelby v. Guy (1826, U. S.) 11 Wheat. 3G1; Sinart v. Baugh (1831, Ky.)
3 J. J. Marsh. 363; Townsenzd 'v. Jemison (1850, U. S.) 9 How. 407.
5Peiser v. G-rifln (1899) 125 Calif. 9, 57 Pac. 690; see Campbell v. Holt
(1885) 115 U. S. 620, 623, 6 Sup. Ct. 209, 211.
6 Davis v. Ballard (1829, Ky.) 1 J. J. Marsh. 563; Orman v. Van Arcdell
(1904) 12 N. M. 344, 78 Pac. 48; Gilbert v. Sellec: (1919) 93 Conn.
412, 106 AtI. 439; contra: Chambers v. Gallagher (1918) 177 Calif. 704,
171 Pac. 931. For discussion of cases cited therein see infra, notes 1-19.
7Retzer v. Wood (1883) 109 U. S. 185, 3 Sup. Ct. 164; see Cook . Cham-
bers (1886) 107 Ind. 67, 68, 8 N. E. 10. In Chesapeake etc. Canal Co. v.
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conflict of laws,8 .general statutes of limitations relating to this
second type of action have been labelled "procedural" and are fre-
quently said to affect the remedy only. Carrying this label over
into constitutional law," the Supreme Court held, in Campbell v.
Holt,10 that the bar of such a statute extinguished the remedy
only, and that giving a new remedy after the bar had accrued
would not involve the creating of such a new right in the plaintiff
or the raising of such a new duty in the defendant as to constitute
a taking of property. In the instant case the Supreme Court,
though reaching the opposite result, has practically paralleled
the technique and reasoning of Campbell v. Holt. They adopted
from pleading" and conflict of laws'2 cases the rule that a limita-
tion is "substantive" where a right of action created by statute
has had a special limitation placed upon it by the same statute
or by another statute which specially refers to it. Thereafter,
they deduced the result that the running of such a special statute
destroyed the right as well as the remedy and that to give a new
remedy would involve the creation of such a new duty in the de-
fendant as to be taking his property without due process of law;
but it is evident that, however helpful the terms "remedial" and
"substantive" may be in pleading and conflict of laws cases, they
constitute no basic test of what is within the protection of the
Federal Constitution. If a "substantive" statute of limitations
is defined as one that destroys both the right and remedy of the
plaintiff, the conclusion of the instant case, correct on its facts, is
inevitably attained. Similarly if a "remedial" statute of limita-
tions is defined as one that destroys only the remedy, leaving the
plaintiff's right intact, the opposite result, as in Campbell v. Holt,
United States (1915, C. C. A. 3d) 223 Fed. 926, 928, it was said that
"statutes of limitation presuppose an established substantive right, but for-
bid the plaintiff from enforcing it by the customary remedies," and that,
therefore, the statute is a weapon of defense and ordinarily must be pleaded
by the defendant or it is waived.
s McElmoyle v. Cohen (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet, 312, 327, holding that it is
well settled that a plea of the statute of limitations is a "plea to the
remedy, and consequently, that the lex for! must prevail." Mich. Ins. Bk.
v. Eldred (1888) 130 U. S. 693, 696, 9 Sup. Ct. 690, 691.
9 The case most strongly relied on by the Supreme Court in Campbell v.
Holt, supra note 5, was one whose main issue was one of pleading, a dictum
therein stating that the running of a statute of limitations cannot be put
in under a plea of the general issue in an action of debt, for the debt is
not paid or extinguished, but only the remedy destroyed. "Time does not
pay the debt, but time may vest the right of property." Smart v. Baugh,
supra note 4, at 366.
2o Supra note 5.
" Phillips v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1915) 236 U. S. 662, 666, 35 Sup. Ct.
444, 446 (defendant can demur generally to an action brought under the
Interstate Commerce Act and put in the defense of the running of the
statute of limitations, for the right as well as the remedy is gone).
12 The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199, 214, 7 Sup. Ct. 140, 147 (wrong-
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is as surely reached. The difficulty is that these definitions create
a distinction where there is no difference, at least in the field of
constitutional law. The very basis of the distinction is challenged
by a large body of opinion holding that there can be no surviving
right where all remedies are destroyed.'5  Moreover, looking to
practical results, when the defendant and his assets are again
subjected to suit and judgment after a perfect defense has ac-
crued under a statute of limitations, there would seem to be no
practical difference in the legal relations affected whether the
action is one for the recovery of money or for the recovery of land
or chattels or whether the statute is labelled "procedural" or "sub-
stantive" in conflict of laws and pleading cases. There would
seem to be no such difference as would justify the protection of
one defense by the Constitution, and the denial of similar protec-
tion to another defense. The defendant has $100 less property
whether he has to pay a judgment for that amount or is required
to give up a chattel worth $100."- Each of these cases "requires
the property of one person to be given to another." 15
ful death statute); Davis v. Mills (1904) 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692;
Wood, Limitations (4th ed. 1916) 41.
13 Edwards v. Kearzey (1877) 96 U. S. 595, 600, holding that, "the ideas
of right and remedy are inseparable. Want of right and want of remedy
are the same thing." Huffman, v. Alderson's Adm'r (1876) 9 W. Va. 616,
625; see Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co. (1899) 103 Wis. 373, 376, 79 N. W.
433, where it was said that "depression of remedy . . . is a de-
struction . . . of the right to which such remedy relates. The law
deals only with enforceable rights, and if such a right be changed to a
mere moral obligation, in a legal sense it no longer exists at all." Cf.
Moore v. Luce (1857) 29 Pa. 260, 262. It should be noted, however, that
a contract right may have several concurrent or successive remedies, and
is only extinguished when all substantial remedies are gone. For ex-
ample, suppose that A agrees to sell Blackacre to B and B promises to
pay $1000 and gives as security a mortgage on Whiteacre and pledges his
diamond ring. A statute of limitations might bar only the action of debt,
as did the original statute of 21 Jac. I, c. 16. This would deny merely
one remedy, leaving an action of assumpsit, a decree for specific perform-
ance, or for foreclosure of the mortgage, and a lien on the ring, so that
clearly A still has a legal right to $1000. Hzelbcrt ct al. v. Clarh (1891)
128 N. Y. 295, 28 N. E. 638; Shaw v. Siioway (1888) 145 Mass. 503, 14
N. E. 783. A law curing defects in the remedy, or confirming rights al-
ready existing, or adding to the means of securing and enforcing the same
is constitutional. Pritchard v. Savannah St. and R. R. Co. (1891) 87 Ga.
294, 13 S. E. 493; Laird v. Cartou (1909) 196 N. Y. 169, 89 N. E. 822;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 406. Consequently while
any remedy yet remains, another remedy, though barred, might be restored.
In contract cases a conditional and tenuous remedy is afforded by the rule
that a barred promise is valid consideration for a new promise. If this
is sufficient societal sanction to say that the right survives, Campbell v.
Holt may be supported on this ground.
24 Clark, Adverse Possession of One's Own Debt (1919) 29 YAr LAW
JOURNAL, 91.
isDa-nforth v. Groton Water Co. (1901) 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N. E.
1033.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Indeed the practical result of the distinction drawn in Camp-
bell v. Holt was so contrary to the conception of "vested right"
as entertained by the courts and public alike, that it is generally
avoided by refusal on other grounds to allow a revival of barred
actions. Some of the states have passed constitutional provisions
which prohibit such retrospective legislation.16 Legislatures have
frequently inserted clauses in their statutes denying any inten-
tion to revive barred actions. 1 7  The courts have refused to allow
a revival where the language of the statute in question could be
given effect by any other interpretation, even though the lan-
guage might clearly be broad enough to affect past as well as
existing actions.," The very distinction drawn by Campbell v.
Holt itself between "remedial" and "substantive" statutes has
been employed to refuse revival, and the principal case would
seem to be but another of the cases which thus avoid the effect
of that decision.19
16 Many states have prohibitions against "retrospective" or "retroactive"
legislation. Const. of Colo. (1876) Art. II, sec. 11; Const. of Ga. (1877)
Art. I, sec. III, par. II; Const. of Mo. (1875) Art. II, sec. 15; Const. of N.
H. (1912) Part I, Art. 23; Const. of Ohio (1912) Art. II, sec. 28; Const. of
Tenn. (1870) Art. I, sec. 20; Const. of Tex. (1876) Art. I, see. 16; see
Const. of La. (1913) Art. 166. (This article prohibits the "divesting" of
"vested rights" "unless for purposes of public utility and for adequate
compensation previously made." In view of Art. 167, Art. 166 seems to be
more than a mere declaration of the power of eminent domain.) While
these provisions are held not to prohibit all legislation retroactive in effect,
they deny the respective legislatures the power to revive barred actions.
Willoughby v. George (1879) 5 Colo. 80. A few state constitutions have the
provision that "the legislative assembly shall pass no law for the benefit of
a . . . corporation or any individual . . . retrospective in its
operation." Const. of Idaho (1890) Art. XI, sec. 12; Const. of Mont. (1889)
Art. XV, sec. 13. Such prohibitions deny the legislature the power of re-
viving an action in favor of a corporation or individual. Dolenty v. Broad.
water Cty. (1912) 45 Mont. 261, 122 Pac. 919. Several state constitutions
ratified since the decision of Campbell v. Holt, have provisions that the
legislature "shall have no power to revive any remedy which may have
become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute [of limitation] of this
state". Const. of Ala. (1901) Art. IV, sec. 95; Const. of Miss. (1890) Art.
IV, sec. 97; Const. of Okla. (1907) Art. V, sec. 52. In one case it is pro-
vided that no remedy or right can be affected in a pending case. Const. of
N. M. (1912) Art. IV, sec. 34.
'7 Crowell v. Davenport (1908) 11 Ariz. 323, 94 Pac. 1114; Ryder v.
Wilson's Ex'rs (1879) 41 N. J. L. 9.
IsHopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 213, 135 N. E. 267;
Fullerton-Krueger Lbr. Co. v. No. Pae. Ry. Co., supra note 3. Sometimes
the codes provide for such a rule of interpretation. Code of Iowa, p. 12,
sec. 63, (1).
IgIn addition to these avoidances of Campbell v. Holt, there are several
cases which reach an opposite result from that case, and have been cited
as opposed to it. Actually they have been decided on other than the con-
stitutional grounds. Bradford v. Shine (1871) 13 Fla. 393 (a constitu-
tional convention has no power to legislate); Georgia So. & F. Ry. vL
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If the view is accepted that the right is gone just as much
where the action does not relate to the title to a chattel or real
property as where it does, it would not necessarily mean that
revival must always be denied. For there are "multitudinous
cases" under "curative" and "police power" legislation where
the legislature has been allowed "to call a liability into being
where there was none before", subordinating the rights of indi-
viduals to the "prevailing view of justice." 2" This basis for de-
cision would make possible much the same result that is now
reached through the numerous exceptions to Campbell v. Holt,
but it would have the advantage of avoiding the dangers inci-
dental to such exceptions. For these exceptions may become
such hard and fast rules of law that they will act as deterrents
to a court where a case, falling within one of the exceptions,
seems to require revival on meritorious grounds. Undoubtedly
few revivals of debt or tort claims not involving title would be
allowed, due to the policy of repose on which modern statutes of
limitation are founded.2 Where title to land or chattels was in-
volved probably very few, if any, revivals would be permitted be-
cause of the historical background of our present views upon
property. To what extent the legislature would be allowed to
interfere with "vested rights" would be more a matter of political
and social viewpoint than of strict rules of law.2 Decisions
Smiley (1921) 151 Ga. 795, 108 S. E. 273 (Congress has no power to pre-
scribe rules of procedure for state courts); Kannlelo3 v. Great 'ortcran
By. Co. (1922) 151 Minn. 157, 186 N. W. 389 (similar to the principal
case); N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Lazaras (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 278 Fed. 900
(provision in the contract between the parties limiting the time for bringing
action so that to extend the period by legislation would impair the obligation
of contract). Probably the infrequency of revivals due to the many means
of avoidance employed, rather than the existence of any large body of
opinion directly repudiating Campbell v. Holt, is the basis of the statement
by Ames that "Campbell v. Holt stands almost alone." 3 Ames, Select
Essays (1909) 569.
2o Daizforth v. Groton Water Co., supra note 15; Haffnman v. Aldcrson's
Adm'r, supra, note 13; Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock etc. Co. (1924) 238
N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579; West Side Ry. Co. e,. Pittsburg Const. Co. (1910)
219 U. S. 92, 31 Sup. Ct. 196; COiv.ENTS (1925) 34 YALE Lw Jotmn , L, 303.
21 Bell v. Morrison (1828, U. S.) 1 Pet. 351, 360; William.s v. 1tillage of
Port Chester (1902, 2d Dept.) 72 App. Div. 505, 515, 76 N. Y. Supp. 631,
638; see Bettmn 'v. Cowley (1898) 19 Wash. 207, 216, 53 Pac. 53, 56, hold-
ing that "statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, intended to put at
rest controverted questions of fact, to insure to a degree certainty in
testimony by compelling its production before it is affected by the infirmi-
ties of memory". Wood, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 56.
22 Winfree v. No. Pac. Ry. Co. (1912) 227 U. S. 296, 301, 03 Sup. Ct.
273, holding that the legislature may raise new rights only where the
statutes are "such as [are] intended to remedy mischief, to promote public
justice, to correct innocent mistakes, to cure irregularities in judicial pro-
ceedings or to give effect to acts and contracts of individuals according to
the intention thereof." In Danforth v. Groton Watdr Co., aupra. note 15,
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would thus be made straightforwardly on the basis of the social
benefit of revival rather than on fictitious and technical distinc-
tions. 23
THE EXTENT OF THE SUBROGEE'S REMEDY
1. The Surety. The surety has been called a favorite of the
law.' The favoritism shown him exemplifies the truism that
rules of law originate, not merely in deductive logic, but often in
the sympathies of the bench. In former times the surety was
in the typical instance a friend of the borrower, often more
generous than discreet, who assumed gratuitously the collateral
obligation and thereby subjected himself to possibility of finan-
cial loss. In his favor, therefore, all doubts of construction of
the contract of suretyship were resolved.- For his relief the
chancellor imported from the civil law the remedy of subroga-
tion,3 creating in him certain wholly new legal relations coex-
tensive in some degree with those extinguished in the creditor,
but differing from them insofar as necessary to accord to him
that "natural justice" 4 which the chancellor intended he should
receive. But, since the foundation of the rules favoring the
Holmes, J., said, "Perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been
as sound as the instinct which directed the decisions. It may be that it
would have been better to say definitely that constitutional rules, like those
of common law, end in a penumbra where the legislature has a certain free-
dom in fixing the line, as has been recognized with regard to the police
power." The case of Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners (1922)
258 U. S. 338, 340, 42 Sup. Ct. 325, is one which Holmes, J., considered not to
be a case where the creation of a new right should be allowed, though ad-
mitting that "when rights are asserted on the ground of some slight tech-
nical defect or contrary to some strongly prevailing view of justice, courts
have allowed them to be defeated by subsequent legislation and have used
various circumlocutions."
23 There was no strong equity in favor of revival in the principal case,
for suits might be brought by or against carriers and judgments rendered
during the period of federal control as theretofore. Act of Mar. 21, 1918,
sec. 10 (40 Stat. at L. 451, 456); Director General's Order of Apr. 9, 1918.
1 This phrase occurs in many cases. E.g., see Kingsbury v. Westfall
(1875) 61 N. Y. 356, 360.
2 National Park Bank v. Koehler (1912) 204 N. Y. 174, 97 N. E. 468;
Simpson Logging Co. v. Northwest Bridge Co. (1913) 76 Wash. 533, 137
Pac. 127; In rtl Quimby's Estate (1914) 84 N. J. Eq. 1, 92 At. 56; United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. French Mitt. Gen. Soc. (1914, C. C. A. 4th.) 212
Fed. 620.
3 Spencer, Suretyship (1913) sec. 133.
4 Cf. Lord Brougham in Hodgson v. Shaw (1834, Ch.) 3 Myl. & K. 183,
190, quoted in Spencer, lee. cit. supra note 3.
5 It was not at first realized that the rights of the surety were new and
those of the creditor extinguished, the theory being that the rights of the
creditor were transferred "bodily" to the surety. Hence it was once held in
England that a surety who had paid a specialty debt became a mere con-
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surety lay in the gratuitous nature of the burden he assumed,
the rule was developed that the remedy of subrogation was not
to be employed for the purpose of profit., Accordingly a well
established line of decisions holds that if the surety is able
to pay off the obligation in depreciated currency 7 or other
commodity of less value than the face of the debts he can
recover by way of indemnity only the amount he has expended.
With the rise of modern business methods, the prevailing notions
of fairness have changed, and some of the rules relating to surety-
ship have been modified. The typical surety today in business
transactions of any size is the surety company, organized for
profit and, of course, allowed to exact it in the form of premiums.
Inasmuch as the surety company is more like an insurer than
an ancient surety, in the "adhesive" 5 nature of the contract it
presents to the borrowing public, the rule of contract construc-
tion has been reversed as to it, all doubts being construed against
the surety company.", It is usual nowadays to allow the surety
tract creditor of the estate of the insolvent debtor, not being entitled to the
priority of a specialty creditor because the rights under the bond had been
extinguished by payment. Copis '. Middleton (1823, Ch.) Turn. & R.
224. This ill-advised rule was changed by statute in England. (1856) 19
& 20 Vict., c. 97, sec. 5. At the same period the contrary rule was followed
by the United States Supreme Court. Liddcrdalc'. Ex'rs v. Ex'r of Rob-
son (1827, U. S.) 12 Wheat. 594. The early English rule gained some cred-
ence in this country, however. See (1905) 63 L. R. A. 513, note; Nomr
AxD Comi ENT (1923) 21 MICH. L. REV. 795.
6 Spencer, op. cit. supra note 3, see. 127.
7 Owings v. Owihngs (1830, Ky.) 3 J. J. Marsh. 590; Crozier's Trurtcca v.
Grayson (1830, Ky.) 4 J. J. Marsh. 514; Gillspic v. C,.-cimll 11,11, Md.)
12 Gill & J. 36; Kendrchi v. Fonzcy (1872, Va.) 22 Grat. 748; Btalcr v.
Butler's Adin'r (1873) 8 W. Va. 674; Fcamstcr e. lrith'ow (1876) 9 W. Va.
296, aff'd (1878) 12 W. Va. 611; Succecssion of Diddgrave (1879) 31 L1.
Ann. 703.
8 Blow v. Maynard (1830, Va.) 2 Leigh, 29; Hic aaa, v. MCz:'rdy (1832,
Ky.) 7 J. J. Marsh. 555; Martindale v. Brock (1874) 41 Md. 571; Dclaxare
R. R. v. Oxford Iron Co. (1884) 38 N. J. Eq. 151.
9 Cf. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy (1919) 33 H,nv.
L. REv. 198, at 222; C011 MNTS (1925) 35 MYuE LAW JourwAL, 203, 206.
10 United States v. Bayly (1912) 39 App. D. C. 105; People v. Tratrc3
(1915) 188 Mich. 345, 154 N. W. 130; Streator Clay Mfg. Co. ?,. Henniy-
Vineyard Co. (1916) 176 Iowa, 297, 155 N. W. 1001; Fidelity & Dcp. Co. v.
Gill (1925, Mo.) 270 S. W. 700 (settling a conflict in the lower DIiszouri
courts); contra: Bench Canal Drainage Dist. v. Maryland Cavi. Co. (1921,
C. C. A. 8th.) 278 Fed. 67. A number of cases may be found where, al-
though a professional surety company was involved, the court made no
allusion to this fact, and applied the old rule of construction which favored
the unremunerated surety. Bassett v. Amcrican Sur. Co. (1918) 210 InI.
App. 477; Maryland Cas. Co. -e. McAlpia (1923) 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S. E.
644; Roberts v. Security Tr. & Say. Banl (1925, Calif.) 238 Pac. 673;
Skillman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1925, N. J. L.) 130 Atl. 564.
In the last mentioned case, through a strict construction of a contract of
suretyship, it was held that the employee of a contractor could not recover a
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a legal rate of interest on the debt paid from the date of pay-
ment," but not a higher rate provided in the note.' - Similarly,
although some states allow the surety to collect the attorney's fees
in his action against the principal,'- in those that do not a provi-
sion in the note allowing the payee such fees will not aid the
surety.14 But the attitude towards profits, other than premiums
fixed by agreement, has remained unchanged.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Worthingto & Co.
(1925, C. C. A. 5th) 6 Fed. (2d) 502, the plaintiff, contracting to
build a concrete road for the state of Alabama, was required, in
accordance with the usual business custom, to give a bond for the
faithful performance of his undertaking. The defendant surety
company, surety on this bond, in accordance with the provisions
thereof, took over the work on the default of the plaintiff, com-
pleted the job through another contractor, and received from the
state the balance due under the contract. The plaintiff, in an ac-
tion for money had and received, sought to recover from the
surety company the difference between the payment received
from the state and the actual cost of completing the work. Al-
though the court applied to the contract of suretyship the rule of
strict construction against the surety when that point came up
on a collateral issue of admissibility of evidence, it was unwilling
to permit the surety to make a profit other than by its usual prem-
ium and accordingly affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff. No
authority is cited by the court for its decision. Search has
revealed no cases directly deciding the point and only two dicta,",
these being in accord. The decision may perhaps be supported
by reference to a somewhat analogous situation in the field of
fire insurance. Where the loss is caused by the tortious act of a
third party, the insurance company upon paying the amount of
the policy has uniformly been held to be subrogated to the rights
debt owed him by the contractor in an action against the surety on the
contractor's bond. This result is contra to the rule of Royal Ind, Co. v.
Northern Ohio G. & S. Co. (1919) 100 Ohio, 373, 126 N. E. 405, approved
in COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 914.
" Interest was allowed in the following cases: Butler v. Butler's Adm'r,
supra note 7; Feamster v. Withrow, supra note 7; Home Inv. Co. v. Clarson
(1906) 21 S. D. 72, 109 N. W. 507; People v. Metropolitan Sur. Co. (1916,
3d Dept.) 175 App. Div. 43, 161 N. Y. Supp. 616; Baldridge v. Ryan (1924,
Mo. App.) 260 S. W. 536; National Sur. Co. v. Salt Lake County (1925, C.
C. A. 8th) 5 Fed. (2d) 34.
12Waldrip v. Black (1887) 74 Calif. 409, 16 Pac. 226; Hays V. House.
wright (1911, Tex. Civ. App.) 133 S. W. 922; Holloman v. Oxford (1914,
Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 437.
3Morrison v. Fidelity & Dep. Co. (1920) 150 Ga. 54, 102 S. E. 354;
American Sur. Co: v. Heether (1924) 131 Wash. 73, 228 Pac. 857.
'1 Hays v. Housewright, supra note 12; Holloman v. Oxford, supra note
12.
15 McKallip v. Altoona (1919) 265 Pa. 192, 198, 108 Atl. 408, 410; Markee
v. Philadelphia (1921) 270 Pa. 337, 341, 113 At]. 359, 360.
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of the insured against the tort feasor; but its recovery is limited
to the amount of its payment to the insured, any damages in ex-
cess thereof belonging to him. -' From the standpoint of expedi-
ency the doubt arises whether the instant decision may not be
undesirable as permitting an entrepreneur who finds a project
likely to prove unprofitable to evade the duty of completing per-
formance, at the same time retaining his right to any possible
profit. But that danger is perhaps minimized by the considera-
tion that the contractor, realizing his duty to indemnify the
surety for a loss, will be unwilling to relinquish the work to
another who is likely to finish it at greater cost than would he,
himself. 31oreover, under the rule of the instant case the surety
probably meets with less temptation to employ a contractor other
than the best to complete performance; for, as he is not permitted
to retain a profit, he will not be unwilling to pay out the entire
contract price.
(in the March issae the e.,teat of the subrogation of an cnz-
ployer or insurance carim er under Workmen's Cornpensation Acts
will be discussed.)
ALLEGATIONS OF TIME IN PLEADING
It is usually said that at common law every fact upon which is-
sue may be taken must be alleged with the day, month and year
upon which the fact occurred., MIost of the writers- on code plead-
1. See (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 386. The only confusion has been in the
means to be used to bring about this result. Where the insurance cover3
the whole amount of the loss, at common law the action must be brought in
the name of the insured. Peoria M. & F. Izs. Co. v. Frost (1865) 37 Il.
333. But under the "real-party-in-interest" provision of the codes the in-
surer is the proper party plaintiff. Aetna Ins. Co. -. Charleston & IF. C.
Ry. (1907) 76 S. C. 101, 56 S. E. 783. And an action against the tort
feasor by the insured who has been paid by the insurer is demurrable.
Allen v. Chicago & N.\ W. Ry. (1S96) 94 Wis. 93, GS N. W. 873. In the more
usual instance where the loss exceeds the amount of the insurance it has
been usual to require the suit to be brought in the name of the insured,
who holds a portion of his judgment equal to the insurance as trustee for
the insurer. Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry z. Shutt (1909) 24 Okla. 96, 10
Pac. 51. In such a suit it is no concern of the defendant whether the in-
surer or the insured finances the litigation. Coff man vc. Louisville & N.
R. R. (1913) 184 Ala. 474, 63 So. 527. In some jurisdictions it is required
that the insured and insurer be joined as plaintiffs on the theory that they
are joint owners of the right of action. Moore v. Taylor (1916, 3d Dept.)
175 App. Div. 37, 161 N. Y. Supp. 480. It has also been held that if the
insured, having compromised his claim with the tort feasor, refuZes to sue,
suit may be brought by the insurer in its own name joining the insured as
party defendant. Grain Dealers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. V. MissozHri, It. & T. Ry.
(1916) 98 Kan. 344, 157 Pac. 1187.
I Ring v. Roxbrough (1832, Exch.) 2 Cr. & J. 418; Stephen, Pleadig (Ty-
ler's ed. 1895) 278; cf. 1 Chitty, Pleading, *257.
" Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 1904) 569; Bliss, Code Pleadizg
(1894) sec. 296; Newman & Bullitt, Pleading, Practice and Forms (1910)
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ing announce substantially the same rule, although some of the
code cases 3 qualify it to some extent. A similar practice obtains
under the system of notice pleading. 4 The requirement is simple,
and compliance on the part of the pleader generally imposes no
hardship upon him. Moreover, even in ordinary private conver-
sations, it is natural to specify the date when relating events.
Some of the reasons which are now assigned for the rule had
much justification at an earlier period, but have little if any to-
day. The practice of alleging time goes back for centuries and
antedates both written pleadings and jury trial. The coroners'
rolls- show that the appellor in the appeals of felony mentions
the time when the act was done. While the earlier curic regis
rolls do not usually mention time either in the appeals or present-
ments,7 it must be remembered that these were not at first com-
plete records of what actually took place. The chief interest of
the persons who made the records was in the king's revenue;
and generally only the data which might concern the collection of
fines, amercements, and forfeitures were recorded., Bracton
says that in the appeals the date must be mentioned. His state-
ment is fortified by the contents of the coroners' rolls, and is
not disproved by the absence of time in the early curia regis rolls.
The records as early as 1308 show that the date is mentioned in
personal actions.10 There is an early holding, however, that in
sec. 218. See also Ames v. Nostrum (1912) 53 Colo. 246, 125 Pac. 120.
But see Bryant, Code Pleading (1899) 194, 195; Kerr, Pleading & Practico
(1919) sec. 847.
3 Backus v. Clark (1863) 1 Kan. 303; Denny v. The North Western
Christian University (1861) 16 Ind. 220; People v. Ryder (1855) 12 N. Y.
433.
4 Odgers, Pleading and Practice (8th ed. 1918) 123-127; forms, ibid.
423-469; Parpaite Freres v. Dickinson (1878, C. P.) 38 L. T. 178.
5 Gross, Select Coroners' Rolls (1895) 18, 21, 32, 71, 107, 118, 125. The
accuracy of the records of the early coroners' inquests with reference to
time and other details, ibid. 15, 96, 101, is accounted for by the strictness
of the justices in eyre in their inquiry of happenings since the last eyre.
Bracton, De Legibus Angliae, f. 140, 140 b.
a Maitland, Select Pleas of the Crown (1888) nos. 19, 23-35, 163, 165,
190, and many others. In nos. 115, 164, 166, 203, time is mentioned.
Time is mentioned in the pleading which is set forth in the Year Booh
for 1313-1314, Maitland, Eyre of Kent (1910) 114.
7 Maitland, Select Pleas of the Crown, nos. 46-48, 52, 54, 146. Mait-
land, Eyre of Kent, 70 et seq. See, however, Gross, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 117.
8 See Bolland, The General Eyre (1922) 18-20, 91. See also infra note 12.
9 Bracton, f. 139, states that the hour as well as the day must be stated.
This was customary in the earlier appeals, but seems to have been discon-
tinued. The forms in the Mirror of Justices, Bk. II, Ch. XV, XVII, for
appeals of homicide, larceny and robbery contain the date but not the hour.
10 (1308-1310) Y. B. 2 & 3 Edw. II (Publications of Selden Society, 1904,
Vol. 19) p. 2 9 (replevin) ; p. 74 (trespass); p. 88 (covenant); p. 153 (debt).
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pleading a judgment of the King's court as a defense in an action
of novel disseisin only the year of the judgment need be pleaded. 1
In the old real actions there seems to be no need that the date
of the disseisin be alleged with any more particularity than the
king's reign in which it occurred.12  A reason for this may be that
the demandant was claiming recovery of land of which the ten-
ant was then in possession, and the wrong was in effect a con-
tinuing one. Another distinction can be made. The appeal of
felony must be fresh. 3 What the parties said in their oral
pleadings was one means at least of determining the freshness
of the appeals. Trial was ordinarily by battle and there was
usually no rational inquiry into the facts aside from the parties'
pleadings.- In the real actions, however, the limitations within
which the action could be brought were liberal, 3 and the king's
reign in which the disseisin took place was sufficient to show that
the proceeding was timely. That allegation of date was for the
21 (1292) Y. B. 20-21 Edw. I, 6-9 (Rolls Series).
'2At least this came to be the rule. Rc v. Bishop of Chester (1693,
K. B.) 2 Salk. 560. For forms, see Stephen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 65;
3 Chitty, op. cit. supra note 1, at "1360. The earlier plea rolls show that
it was customary in writs of right for the demandant to allege seisin of
the ancestor on the day that Henry I died. Baildon, Select Ci vil Pleas
(1890) no. 250 (1202). This date was the first legal limitation in writs
of right. See infra note 15. Thus it was not permissible to allege seisin
"in the time" of Henry I (Baildon, op. cit. supra, no. 76) for one could not
go back of the day of Henry I's death, while it was perfectly permissible
to allege seisin "in the time" of Henry II. Ibid. no. 78, 80. There was an
interesting practice of paying the king a demi-mark for the privilege of
taking issue on the demandant's allegation of the king's reign in which
the disseisin took place. Littleton, Tenures, sec. 514; Coke, Institutes, zec.
514; Fitzherbert, N. B. 5, 31. See (1313) Y. B. 7 Edw. II, 71 (Selden
Society, vol. 39); (1340) Y. B. 14 & 15, Edw. III, 16-19 (Rolls Series);
Ten Eyck v. Waterbunj (1827, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 7 Cow. 51.
- Northunberland Assize Rolls (1890) 117 (1256), appeal dismissed be-
cause appellor did not sue out his appeal in the next county court; 2
Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (1899) 606. Compare MNiror
of Justices Bk. III, Ch. XIII.
14 The superior importance attached to pleading before evidence was
heard in court must be borne in mind. See 3 Holdsworth, History of Eng-
lish Law (1923) 638. This is illustrated by a novcl disscisin case in (1302)
Y. B. 30 & 31, Edw. I, 132-135 (Rolls Series): "Brmpton. How shall we
be certified of this fresh suit? Wescote. By the assize, and our 'journey
accounts'. Brampton. You ought to have pleaded on that, and have
vouched the records thereof, and we should not have gone to the as-
size. . . ." Of course even when trial was by battle, it was possible
to have inquiry from other sources than the pleadings. See Maitland,
Select Pleas of the Crown, 7 (1201) 35, 41 (1202); Maitland, Plea3 of the
Crown for the County of Gloucester (1884) 87 (1221). The coroners' rolls
are sometimes referred to, in order to determine whether appeals are
fresh. Northumberland Assize Rolls (1256) 117.
is See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *18 8 , 019 6 ; 2 Polloek & M,"aitland,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 51, 81.
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purpose of showing commencement of the action within due time
cannot be proved. It is possible that long before this was ever
thought of, allegations of time had become a habit or a customary
requirement. Evidently the writer of the Mirror of Justices
thought these allegations purely formal, for he speaks of the re-
quirement as an abuse.16
As soon as the pleadings were checked up by the juror-wit-
nesses and later by proofs in court, it was possible for the allega-
tion of time to serve a new purpose and also for new questions to
arise. Was one function of the allegation to give notice to the
triers 17 or the opponents? What was the effect of the allegation
of a wrong date? The rule as applied in the modern setting is
not as free from difficulty as it would seem. There are ramifica-
tions as soon as one tries to answer the latter question or to
discover the effect of omission of time or the use of the words
"on or about". The holdings, and particularly the dicta, do not
cohere with each other or with most of the common explanations
of the rule. Consideration of the latter will do much to clarify
the situation.
Several reasons or policies are often suggested by a single
court or writer. Among these 8 are that time must be alleged
(1) as a matter of form,", (2) to produce certainty,20 (3) to show
that the action accrued before commencement of suit and within
the period of limitations, 2' (4) to dispose of the case upon the
pleadings,2 2 (5) in order that issue can be taken thereon, 21 (6)
16 Bk. V, Ch. I, No. 66.
17 In Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) 114, it is sug-
gested that a purpose of oral pleading was to get the facts fixed in the
jury's mind. See also Holdsworth, loc. cit. supra note 14.
18 Compare with the classification of the purposes of pleading in general
prepared by Dean Pound (1910) 35 A. B. A. REP. 638, 639.
l9 Denny v. The North Western Christian University, supra note 3;
Backus v. Clark, supra note 3; People v. Ryder, supra note 3; Bliss, loc.
cit. supra note 2; Stephen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279. See also supra
note 16.
20 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 278; Ames v. Nostrum, supra note 2.
21 The Bancroft Co. v. Haslett (1895) 106 Calif. 151, 39 Pac. 602; Ship-
man, Common Law Pleading (3d ed. 1923) 456. But see Baekus
v. Clark, supra note 3, at 306-7, and Chitty, op. cit. supra note 1, at *288.
At common law a person cannot ordinarily raise the defense of the statute
of limitations by demurrer. Wall v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R. (1902) 200 I1.
66, 65 N. E. 632. California permits this practice. California Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. v. Sierra Valley Ry. (1910) 158 Calif. 690, 698, 112 Pac.
274. See supra text, and notes 12-15..22 Clyde v. Johnson (1894) 4 N. D. 92, 58 N. W. 512. See also People v.
Ryder, supra note 3; Williamson v. Joyce (1902) 137 Calif. 151, 69 Pac.,
980. In Sutherland, Code Pleading (1910) sec. 6888, it is said that there
should be distinct allegations of time of fraud and discovery thereof so
that the court can judge of the diligence in bringing suit.
23 See references to Littleton, Fitzherbert, etc., supra note 12. Of course
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to show for res judicata purposes what matters were decided in
the case, -4 (7) to give notice to the opponents.2-,
Distinction is usually made between cases in which time is
"immaterial" and cases where time is "material".: - Time is said
to be usually "immaterial". Examples of this are the dates of a
trespass, assault, conversion, or oral agreement * While the
pleader must allege dates in such cases, it is well settled that he is
not required to prove the exact time pleaded. -  There are a few
cases where time is said to be "material". Here it is commonly
claimed that the pleader is obliged to prove the exact date al-
leged,20 and even an allegation under a vidclicet will not soften
the strict rule °0  Sometimes a particular justification of the rule
requiring allegations of time can obviously apply only to cases of
"material" time or to cases of "immaterial" time and not to both.
Stephen places all his rules relating to the allegations of time
among those "which tend to produce certainty and particularity
in the issue".2 1 Yet obviously this does not mean much with ref-
erence to the case of "immaterial" time. Here Stephen says a
pleader can practically allege whatever time he pleases12 This,
of course, does not produce certainty in the issue; for no issue can
if the allegation of time is one which must be proved in order to give any
substantive right to recover, there is merit in this position. See iaira
note 45.
2- Shipman, op. cit. svpra note 21, at 458.
2 See Bond v. The Central Bank of Georgia (1847) 2 Ga. 92, 100; City
Council of Augusta v. Marlks (1905) 124 Ga. 365, 367, 52 S. E. 539, 511;
Internatiofml & G. N. R. R. v. Pape (1889) 73 Tex. 501, 11 S. W. 520.
Reference here and izfra to notice-giving is not used in the sense of a Sys-
teni of notice pleading like that of the Chicago Municipal Court but to the
notice function of pleading in general.
20 Stephen, op. c~t. supra note 1, at 279, 280; Newman & Bullitt, op. cit.
szora note 2, at 218a; Phillips, Code Pleading (189G) 317.
27 Peter v. Knoll (1593, K. B.) Cro. Eliz. 32; Webb r. Turner (1738, K. B.)
Strange, 1095; Central of Georgia R. R. v. Teasky (1914) 187 Ala. 010,
65 So. 981; The Bancroft Co. -v. Haslett, supra note 21; Kidder v. Bacon
(1902) 74 Vt. 263, 52 Atl. 322; Sage v. Hawley (1844) 1G Conn. 100. Cf.
contra: Central of Georgia Ry. v. Sinmuons (1907) 150 Ala. 400, 43 So. 731.
28 See cases supra note 27. Stephen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279, states
that the pleader must make his allegation under a videlicet or he must
prove the exact date alleged. Acc'd: Phar & Beef: v. Bachelor (1841) 3
Ala. 237 (dictum). Chitty, op. cit. szapal note 1, at 031 8, claims that a vide-
lcet is not necessary in order to prove a different time. Acc'd: Scarizg i
Butler (1873) 69 Ill. 575; Beason-v . Western Meat Co. (1912) 40 Utah, 303,
124 Pac. 335; Davis v. Kelley (1923) 90 Olda. 17, 219 Pac. 923 (semblel.
29 See cases cited infra notes 41, 42.
32 Schlatter v. Rector's Adi.r (1823) 1 Mo. 16; The Gcraadia Fire
Ins. Co. v. Liebernman (1871) 58 Ill. 117.
31 See supra note 20. Cf. contra: Shipman, op. cit. supra note 21, at 450.
22 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279.
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be taken on the time,33 and a pleader may mention the wrong date
purposely in order to mislead the opponent, seemingly without
prejudice to himself.3 4  Many courts have said, therefore, that
the rule is a mere formal one in cases where time is "immate-
rial"3r In the case of "immaterial" time, it would be a dull
pleader indeed who could not allege some time between commence-
ment of suit and six years before. Cases of "immaterial" time
cannot be disposed of upon the pleadings because of allegations
of time. Of course, it is possible even in such cases to sustain
demurrers because of the failure to allege time ° or the pleading
of an impossible" or future date 3 or one beyond the period of
limitations.30 But these rulings will not dispose of the contro-
versy, nor under modern practice even the present proceeding.
The use of the allegation of time for the purpose of determining
what was adjudicated fails in the case of "immaterial" time, for
one is never sure that the alleged time was the one concerned at
the trial. While pleadings may be possibly useful for res judi-
cat purposes, it is now high time that we abandon the attempt
to make rules and theories of pleading around this occasional
function.40 Reserving for later consideration, the notice-giving
function of allegations of time, all of the other suggestions for
the basis of the rule fail in the cases of "immaterial" time with
the exception of the view that the requirement is merely a formal
33 Aldis v. Mason (1851) 11 C. B. 132; see Fletcher v. Hennington (1760,
K. B.) 1 B1. W. 210.
34 As to the risk that the pleader assumes in alleging the wrong date,
see infra note 49.
35 See supra note 19.
86 Stransham's Case (1588, Exch.) Cro. Eliz. 98 (bill abates after ver-
dict because of failure to allege time and place of conversion). Evidently
this doctrine did not apply with such strict vigor when the litigants were
peers! Elizabeth, Countess of Rutland v. Isabel, Countess of Rutland
(1595, C. B.) Cro. Eliz. 377. The omission was cured by verdict by the
statute of jeofails, 16 & 17 Car. 2 c. 8. See Bond v. Central Bank of
Georgia, supra note 25 and infra note 50.
37 Wildbore v. Cogan (1606, K. B.) Yel. 94, nil capiat per billam entered
on theory that an impossible time was equivalent to no time. The im-
possibility here is of an extremely refined nature.
's Cheetham v. Lewis (1808, N. Y.) 3 Johns. 42; see also Bemis v. Faxon
(1808) 4 Mass. 263; Langer v. Parish (1822, Pa.) 8 Serg. & R. 134.
'1 See Backus v. Clark, and cases following it in supra note 21.
40 See Dean Pound, loc. cit. supra note 18. Where the common counts
(Washington, Alexandria & G. S. P. Co. v. Sickles (1860, U. S.) 24 How.
333) or the general issue (Wright v. Griffey (1893) 147 Ill. 496, 35 N. E.
732) are pleaded, parol evidence is necessary to determine what was ad-
judged. It is possible to amend the pleading to comply with the proof.
Whether this record accuracy is sufficiently important to warrant tho
trouble is problematical. Certainly the common law required no such
amendment in case of proof of a different "immaterial" time. See Sutter
v. Streit (1855) 21 Mo. 157; Dawkins v. Smithwick (1851) 4 Fla. 158, 105.
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one. Of course, the latter position is unsatisfactory in an en-
lightened age.
The classical example of "material" time is Carlisle v. Trcas,"
which was an action qzu tam on a statute against usury. There
was a rule to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff because the dec-
laration stated a loan from December 21, 1774, until December
23, 1776, while the evidence showed a loan from December 23,
1774. The rule was made absolute. Lord Mlansfield said: "The
usurious contract must be proved as laid; whereas the contract
proved in this case is totally different from the contract stated in
the declaration." In this case the parties had evidently litigated
the matter of a certain loan made by the defendant. That loan
was concededly usurious. There was no claim of surprise on the
part of the defendant. It seems unjust and wasteful to require
an amendment of pleadings and a new trial in such case.
Another instance of "material" time is said to be the date of a
written instrument.-! Here, there is seldom any excuse for a
mistake on the part of the pleader unless perchance he did not
have the instrument available. Yet there is little justification
for making the error fatal. Possibly the philosophy of the older
judges was that care and honesty should be practiced in pleading
time, and that where the date could be easily and certainly deter-
mined, or could be used to express some material element of the
case, they would penalize the careless or dishonest pleader by
nonsuiting him. Although the case is one where time was for-
merly said to be "material", there is a tendency to hold that
proof of another date is not a fatal variance2 Under the modern
variance statutes,-' which provide that a variance has no effect
unless the pleadings mislead the opposite party, the courts are
permitted, if not commanded, to disregard failure to prove time
as alleged. In very few cases should a date be vital under such
statutes. Only when the date is bound up with the substance of
the case, so that failure to prove an exact date will give one no
substantive right at all, should a variance be fatal or issue be
41 (1777, K. B.) 2 Cowp. 672. See also Paine e. Trumnbull (1873) 33 Wis.
164.
42 The Germania Fire In. Co. v. Lieberman, supra note 30; Da zrin v.
Young (1886) 27 W. Va. 436; Keyes z. Dearborn (1841) 12 X. H. 52;
Gulick v. Loder (1835) 14 N. J. L. 572.
43 Shelinsky v. Foster (1913) 87 Conn. 90, 87 At]. 35; Lothrop V. Sot.-
worth (1858) 5 Blich. 436; Delsman, v. Friedlandcr (1901) 40 Or. 33, 6
Pac. 297; United States v. Le Baron (1866, U. S.) 4 Wall. G42.
4 The Kansas statute is a typical one: "No variance between the alle-
gations, in a pleading, and the proof is to be deemed material, unles3 ik
have actually misled the adverse party, to his prejudice, in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. . . ." Kan. Rev. St. 1023,
60-753. For another sort of statute, see Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, Eec.
12583. The variance statutes have had some effect on decisions relating to
492,
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taken on the date, or an issue of law settled by demurrer. In such




Finally, it is suggested in some cases that dates must be al-
leged in order to give notice to opponents. 0 At first it may ap-
pear that there can be no notice when the pleader is not obliged
to prove the date as alleged, as is generally the case. It might
seem that we must either hold the party to proof as alleged in all
cases-a most reactionary position, which no one advocates-or
else abandon the view that the requirement serves a notice-giving
function. There is, however, another alternative. Pleadings
should be true,47 and perhaps the pleading or the offensive part
could be stricken out as a sham.4 8 There is also another safe-
guard which will keep the wily or careless pleader in the paths
of truth. If one time is alleged and attempt is made to prove an-
other, the opponent should be entitled to a continuance if he is
surprised or misled-even if time is "immaterial"., The possi-
bility of a continuance and its accompanying costs is a substantial
deterrent to the practice which Stephen evidently advocates in the
case of "immaterial" time, of assigning whatever time one pleases.
If the opponent is not surprised but knows to what the pleader
refers, he should not complain of an erroneous date, for he needs
no notice.
Unless-as is seldom the case-a continuance is prayed, the
courts fail to appreciate how allegations of time can serve a
notice-giving function. Three recent cases illustrate this: Com-
monwealth v. Weiss (1925, Pa.) 130 Atl. 403; Dominelli v.
Markowski (1925, Del. Super. Ct.) 128 Atl. 527; Berman v.
Standard Wood Heel Co. (1925, App. Div. 2d Dept.) 211 N. Y.
proof of time. See Davis v. Kelley, supra note 28, and an interesting line
of New York cases discussed in Bradbury, Rules of Pleading (1911) 207.
4Z Clyde v. Johnson, supra note 22; Union Pao. R. R. v. Dyohe (1882)
28 Kan. 200; Griggs v. City of St. Paul (1864) 9 Minn. 246. The question
involved in Hubert v. New York N. H. & H. R. R. (1916) 90 Conn. 261,
96 Atl. 967, is of quite a different nature, viz., whether the jury could find
that an accident happened on a different day than suggested by the testi-
mony.
4 See cases supra note 25.
47 Stephens, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 384, states this as a rule of pleading;
yet in his discussion of allegations of time he inferentially denies it. See
supra note 32.
-18 See First National Bank of St. Cloud v. Lang (1905) 94 Minn. 261,
102 N. W. 700. Most courts would probably restrict such remedy to cases
of impossible or future dates. See Upton v. Kennedy (1893) 36 Neb. 66,
53 N. W. 1042; Thompson v. Erie Ry. (1871) 45 N. Y. 468.
"40Louisville & N. R. B. v. Bell (1909) 134 Ky. 139, 119 S. W. 782. Soo
Brown v. Telegraph Co. (1915) 169 N. C. 509, 86 S. E. 290; St. Louis, A.
& T. R. R. v. Evans (1890) 78 Tex. 369, 14 S. W. 798; State v. Buke
(1852) 34 Me. 52.
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Supp. 649. In each of these decisions a proper result was no
doubt reached in the individual case; yet the opinions, unless very
carefully considered, would lead one to believe that pleading time
is a purely formal matter. There was a variance of 56 days in
the Pennsylvania case between the time proved and the time al-
leged in the indictment, which was for murder. Although the
defense was an alibi, it does not appear that the respondent asked
for a continuance, or was in any way misled. In the Domnlizel
case, failure to allege time was held not to be fatal on a general
demurrer,00 but only on special demurrer.l1 Under the codes the
proper procedure is a motion to make more definite and certain. 4;2
So the New York court in the Bei'man case was justified in
overlooking the omission of date. The code motion is an e,:cellent
means of obtaining the necessary notice, if it is not furnished
originally and is desired. A continuance at the trial is the final
club, which will protect the opponent who is misled by the alle-
gation of an incorrect date.
The traditional requirement for the statement of the day
month and year does not work well in some cases. It is perhaps
a general guide but not a satisfactory fixed rule. Cases have
held that the fact must be alleged to have occurred on a particular
day and that "on or about" is insufficient03 Sometimes a party
cannot state the exact date. Then it seems better, for the sake
of common honesty and of giving notice, to use the "on or about"
rather than pick a date more or less at random, the truth of which
is in grave doubt.- On the other hand, it is entirely possible that
the mere date may not be sufficient to give notice. Declarations
in tort actions against railroad and other large corporations
70 General demurrers have been sustained for this reason. Cole v. Bab-
cock (1885) 78 Me. 41, 2 AtI. 545; Shorcy v. Chandler (1888) 80 Me. 403,
15 At. 223. See older cases, supra notes 36, 37.
51 Acc'd: City Council of Augusta -,. Marks, supra note 25; Tinmncrinan
v. Morrsson (1817, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 14 Johns. 369.
52 See People v. Ryder, supra note 3; Hollanud v. Grote (1903) 193 N. Y.
262, 271, 86 N. E. 30; Newman & Bullitt, op. cit. supra note 2, see. 218 (b).
If the motion to make more definite and certain is not available, the same
result can be obtained by a bill of particulars. See Ha ilton v. Circuit
Judge (1891) 84 Mich. 393, 397, 47 N. W. 681; Chattanzooga R. & C. R. R.
v. Palmer (1892) 89 Ga. 161, 15 S. E. 34; May v. Illinois Ccntral R. R.
(1914) 129 Tenn. 521, 167 S. W. 477; Lcvy v. Gillis (1897, Del.) 1 Penne.
119, 39 Atl. 785.
5 Cole v. Babcock, supra note 50; Fuller v. Gage (1014) 112 31e. 447,
92 AtI. 493; Gordon v. Journal Piblishing Co. (1903) 31 Vt. 237, 60 AUt.
742.
'4 May v. Illinwis Central R. R., supra note 52; Hamilton v. Circuit Judge,
supra note 52, justly approve the practice of alleging time 'on or about"
a certain date when the pleader is in doubt, as giving better notice than
the selection of a doubtful date. There is ancient precedent for this form
of pleading. See Gross, op. cit. supra note 5, at 127, 128 (1392).
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should very often state the hour and even the minute in order that
the defendant may properly make its defense.2
The rule requiring allegations of time is a reasonable one, when
rati6nally applied. Its only justification at the present day is that
it gives notice. Many courts and writers in the past have failed
to appreciate this clearly, although perhaps dimly sensing some-
thing of the sort. This confused state of mind no doubt led them
to divide time into "material" and "immaterial" categories and
to approximate justice by treating the former too strictly and the
latter as a purely formal matter."0 Many courts would still hesi-
tate even in the face of modern "variance statutes to attach no
penalty to a variance in "material" time, although no one is in-
jured thereby. There are a few cases where dates are truly
material in the sense that a particular showing must be made in
order to make out a case or a defense. Of course no rule of pro-
cedure can affect such situations. But in all other cases, allega-
tions of time, whether formerly regarded as "material" or "im-
material", should be regarded as notice-giving only. If the op-
ponent is misled by an erroneous date, he should be entitled to a
continuance; if he is not misled, no effect should be given to a
misstatement or variance.
T. E. A.
MARKETABLE "GOODWILL"-THE ASSIGNABILITY IN GROSS OF A
TRADE NAME
The term "goodwill" has been used in connection with sales
of trade-marks and trade names, of a business house with its
stock-in-trade, and of a professional man's practice-all typical
5 See Little Rock & Ft. S. R. R. v. Smith (1899) 66 Ark. 278, 50 S. W.
502; Kersh v. Rome W. & 0. R. R. (1888, 3d Dept.) 14 N. Y. Civ. Proc,
Rep. 167. Cf. contra: Crowley v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. R. (1901)
108 Tenn. 74, 65 S. W. 411; Western R. R. v. Stone (1905) 145 Ala. 663,
39 So. 723.
5 Evidence of this is found in the case of alleging a trespass in
continuando where the pleader is generally confined in his proofs to the
exact time alleged. Pierce v. Pickens (1820) 16 Mass. 470. Cf. contra:
Schiller v. Madden (1914) 190 Ill. App. 624, In the Pierce case it was
said that the plaintiff after pleading in continuando may consider his dec-
laration as containing a single count for a single trespass in which case a
different time can be proved. "But it would be giving an undue advan-
tage to the plaintiff if he could avail himself of the declaration of both
of these modes, and would frequently operate as a surprise on the defend-
ant. He is, therefore, bound to make his election before introducing his
evidence. He must waive the advantage of this peculiar form of declara-
tion before he can be permitted to offer evidence of a trespass at any
other time. ..... It is not that the plaintiff shall not recover for any
trespass within the time specified, and also for a trespass at another
time; but he shall not give evidence of one or more trespasses within the
time, and of another at another time."
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examples. Analysis discloses that the term connotes a set of
legal relations in each of these instances, similar in most instances,
but not necessarily identical. Where in such sales the vendor
covenants not to compete, the contract is said to be in restraint of
trade; and although formerly often unenforceable,1 it is generally
upheld at present, if not unreasonable and if ancillary to the sale
of a business, on the ground that it is the vendee's only means of
protecting his "goodwill".; This argument was carried over to
support the sale of a doctor's practice with a covenant to retire.
In such a case, the "goodwill" which the buyer acquires appears
on analysis to be: (1) the right that his vendor shall no longer
practice in that vicinity, (2) the privilege of approaching the
members of the community as successor to the vendor and with
his recommendation, and (3) the right i rein that others
shall not so approach them.- In cases where a buyer bargains
for the "goodwill" of a business house with its tangible assets,
the operation of the bargain is to create in the buyer the privi-
lege of using the trade-marks, trade name and list of customers
formerly used by his vendor and the right that his vendor shall
not use them,4 and, according to the rule in some states, a further
right by implication that the vendor shall not compete in any
manner within the area to which the trade is restricted.
A sale of "goodwill" is merely the assignment for value of
the above-expressed rights and privileges. Literally defined,
"goodwill" means a state of mind in custdmers, patrons, patients,
I Dyer's Case (1417) Y. B. 2 Hen. V, 5, pl. 26; Anz ymos (15S7, K. B.)
Moore, 242.
2 Broad v. Jollyfe (1620, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 596; Hood v. Lcgg (1025, Ga.)
128 S. E. 891; see Anson, Contracts (Corbin's ed. 1924) sec. 259. A con-
tract in restraint of trade ancillary to the sale of a "business" which had
not yet acquired any "goodwill" has been upheld. Saz'ser v. Kcarjzcj
(1910) 147 Iowa, 335, 126 N. W. 322. But cf. contra: Brotherman v.
Schela. (1925, N. D.) 202 N. W. 132 (contract in restraint of trade invalid
where principal contract did not involve sale of "goodwill").
It is believed that distinguishing between factual "goodwill" and the
legal relations involved will clarify the problem. See Hohfeld, Funda-
mental Legal Co2ceptions (1923) 35 ct seq; Corbin, Legal Analysi a,d
Termiwology (1919) 29 YALE L.aW JOURNL, 163.
- See Church, C. J., in Boon v. Moss (1877) 70 N. Y. 465, 474 ("goodwill"
of newspaper): "The rights and privileges which go to make up the good-
will of such a concern is property, although incorporeal in its nature."
(Italics ours.)
Marshall Engine Co. v. New M3larshall Engine Co. (1909) 203 Mass.
410, 89 N. E. 548; Brovz v. Bezzinger (1912) 118 Mld. 29,84 At!. 79; contra:
Cottrell v. Babcock (1886) 54 Conn. 122, 6 AtL 791 (that "no restraint upon
trade may rest upon inference"). In some jurisdictions the implied re-
straint extends only to the approach to old customers. Trego v. Hunt
[1896, H. L.] A. C. 7; Von Bremen v. Mlacfonnics (1910) 200 N. Y. 41,
93 N. E. 186.
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etc., their "habit patterns" or habits of behavior-, that cause
them to do business at a certain place (location "goodwill")' or
with a particular person (the "goodwill"of a lawyer or doctor)"
or to demand a particular commodity or service by its trade-mark
(popularly advertised articles) 0 or by its trade name (newspapers
or the service of an orchestra).2o A sale of "goodwill" is not and
cannot be a transfer of these "habits of behavior"; but the value
of the rights and privileges created by a "sale of goodwill" will
depend upon whether or not these "habits of behavior" continue
to exist.
In the recent case of Baillj v. Betti (1925) 241 N. Y. 22, 148
N. E. 776, the salability of the trade name and attendant "good-
will" of a partnership engaged in personal services was denied,
although it was clear that the parties considered it as having a
definite commercial value. The plaintiff and defendants entered
into a partnership agreement, as musicians, and styled themselves
the "Flonzaley Quartet". Six months before the date set for
its expiration the defendants notified the plaintiff that his serv-
ices would not be needed after the partnership agreement expired.
'Thereafter the defendants procured another in the plaintiff's
stead, and continued business under the old firm name. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a sale and an account-
ing of the firm assets, but that the trade name and "goodwill"
should not be included. It was said that "a business dependent
solely on the personal skill and professional qualifications of the
person carrying it on" could not possess "a goodwill or copartner-
ship name which could be sold or be transferred to anyone who
might desire to purchase at a sale."
Under this decision, an enterprise whose sole asset is the privi-
lege of using a particular trade name and the right in rem
6 See Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924) 261, 267, 269;
Rowell v. Rowell (1904) 122 Wis. 1, 17, 99 N. W. 473, 478 ("The good will
is a sort of beaten pathway from the seller to the buyer.")
7 This is "nothing more than the probability that the old customers will
resort to the old place." Lord Eldon, in Crutwell v. Lye (1810, Oh.) 17
Ves. 335, 346 (sale of carrier's business). This definition has been criticized
as being too narrow. Trego v. Hunt, supra note 5.
8 Hoyt v. Holly (1872) 39 Conn. 326 (upholding sale of physician's
practice with express reservation that vendor could practice in town when
called upon. Two judges dissented on ground that such a contract was
void as against public policy); Brett v. Ebel (1898, 1st Dept.) 29 App.
Div. 256, 51 N. Y. Supp. 573 (sale of goodwill of carrier without any
tangible "business", vendor covenanting not to compete); Rowe v. Toon
(1918) 185 Iowa, 848, 169 N. W. 38 (sale of physician's practice without
any tangible property).
9 Cf. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel (1923) 260 U. S. 689, 43 Sup. Ct. 244,
reversing (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 275 Fed. 539 ("Poudre Jfava" face powder).
10 The "goodwill" of a newspaper or periodical attaches to its name
exclusively. Boon v. Moss (1877) 70 N. Y. 465; Bradbury v. Dickens
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that others shall not use it, cannot be sold at all, even though
there may be eager purchasers and even though the law fully
recognizes and protects this "asset" before its sale. The creator
of the factual "goodwill" underlying this asset should have a
power of assignment; but the prevailing doctrine is to the con-
trary. Thus in Messer v,. The Fadettes1 the buyer of the entire
interest in the "Fadette Ladies Orchestra" could not enjoin a
third party from using that name in unfair competition, it being
held that since nothing tangible was transferred which the court
could call a "business", no rights were created in the vendee by
the purported sale, although he had paid a valuable consideration.
In Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Tcaehers' Agcney' - it was held
that one who attempted such a "sale" not only transferred noth-
ing to his vendee, but also lost the monopoly of his trade name,
which had become "publici jzois". In Rice e. Angel!" relief was
denied where, upon the dissolution of a partnership of insurance
agents, the plaintiff demanded $5000, offering in the alternative
to pay that amount to the defendant for the exclusive privilege of
continuing the old business under the old name. Similarly in the
instant case the retiring member of the firm was deprived of his
share in the advantages accruing from the "goodwill" which he
had helped to create. That the privileges and rights connected
with this trade name were valuable is evidenced by the fact that
the parties considered it worth fighting for in court.
These decisions have rested upon two grounds: first, that there
is nothing to sell, i.e., no "business" to which the "goodwill" may
"attach" ;". secondly, that such a sale would be a deception or
fraud upon the public.2 With respect to the first, there is
certainly nothing in the nature of "goodwill" and trade names
(1859, Ch.) 27 Beav. 53; Metropoaita Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co.
(1893) 149 U. S. 436, 13 Sup. Ct. 944; of. Christy v. Mutrphly (1856, N. Y.)
12 How. Prac. 77 (originator of "Christy's Minstrels" secured injunction
to restrain former members of band from using that name).
21 (1897) 168 Mass. 140, 46 N. E. 407, criticized in (1897) 11 HAv. L.
REV. 131.
12 (1924, C. C. A. 8th) 3 Fed. (2d) 7; see COMMENTS (1925) 20 ILi. L.
REv. 90.
13 (1889) 73 Tex. 350, 11 S. W. 338.
14 Austen v. Boys (1858, Ch.) 2 De G. & J. 626; Rossing v. State Bcand
of Bode (1917) 181 Iowa, 1013, 165 N. W. 254; Evcrctt 0. FiJs & Co.
v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, supra note 12. In Messcr a,. The Fadette,, supra
note 11, it was said, "The other musicans employed by her [the vendor]
could not, by her contract of sale, be put in the control of any other perzon,
and there was nothing in her relation to them that she could convey." This
objection could be applied equally well to the sale of a newspaper route;
yet such a sale has been upheld. Cf. Scntcr v,. Davis (1869) VS Calif. 40.
15 Knowlton, J.: "It is well settled that the courts will not enforce a
claim-of this dnd which contains a misrepresentation to the public." Mec-
ser v. The Fadettes, supra note 11, at 142. Lathrop, J., dissented.
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which makes their transfer in gross inherently impossible. The
prerequisite of a material thing satisfying the requirements of a
"business" to be handed over may indicate a vestige of an ancient
practice of which livery of seisin is an example, but which would
seem to have no place in modern law. 0 The "goodwill" which
is the product of personal services alone-as in the sale of a
doctor's practice-has been adjudged transferable even though
unaccompanied by the delivery of tangible property. 7 In such
cases the value of the "goodwill" to the buyer arises chiefly from
the exclusion of the vendor "from the same trade or business as
a rival" (extinguishing his privilege of competing).'s But
"sales" have not been upheld in cases like the instant one, where
this value arises chiefly out of the probability that a trade name-
the subject of the "sale"-will attract certain patronage to the
benefit of the vendee.9 Thus it has been held that a mortgage of
the "goodwill" of a newspaper apart from the printing presses
is void, although the "goodwill" in no wise depends upon the
existence of any tangible property.
20
It is difficult to justify this distinction unless the latter type
of "sale" of the "goodwill" connected with a trade name succumbs
to the second objection mentioned above, namely, that it would
10 Cf. 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1905) 226;
see cases cited infra note 17 . "Rights were a quality of a res or a sort
of emanation therefrom. Contract rights were supposed to be non-assign-
able because they were personal relations and the 'person' did not pass."
17 Rowe v. Toon, supra, note 8; Brett v. Ebel, supra note 8; Seuter V.
Davis, supra note 14 (newspaper route) ; Bradbury v. Dickens, supra note
10 (court ordered sale of title of literary periodical on dissolution of
partnership). It is generally stated that "goodwill" "cannot be sold
. . . apart from the business with which it is connected". Hopkins,
Trademarks, Tradenames and Unfair Competion (4th ed. 1924) 226.
What was the "business" in these cases? Certainly it was not anything
tangible, since nothing of that nature was handed over. If the "goodwill"
was attached to a "business" here, it is difficult to understand why the
Aourt is unable to find a "business" where the attempt is made to sell
the "goodwill" and trade name of an orchestra. In Messers v. The Fadottes,
supra note 11, Lathrop, J., dissenting, thought that the requirement of a
"business" had been satisfied. If it were really necessary to meet this
vague requirement and if there could be no "business" without something
tangible, even then the gale in the instant case should have been upheld,
since the music sheets might be considered as satisfying the formal re-
quirement, just as the printing presses satisfy the requirement in the
newspaper case.
Is Story, Partnership (6th ed. 1868) sec. 99. This type of "goodwill"
is distinguished from "an advantage arising from the mere fact of sole
ownership of the premises, stock, or establishment, without reference to
other persons, as rivals." Ibid. The "sole ownership" of a trade name
gives a similar advantage, and should therefore be included.
10 Cases cited supra note 14.
20In rd Leslie-Judge Co. (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 272 Fed. 886, 888 (trade
name of a periodical is "not property which can be owned in gross").
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be likely to promote fraud and deception of the public. Analysis
indicates that it should not. Vendees of the "goodwill' of com-
mercial partnerships may continue to use the personal names
of their vendors after the latter have severed all connection with
the business.1 The same rule has been applied upon dissolution
of a partnership of lawyers. -2  In fact, the only limitation placed
upon the use of a predecessor's name in such transfers is merely
that the vendor shall not be exposed to any unwarranted respon-
sibility as a result thereof.*3 The protection of the public is left
to the general law as to fraudulent representations. In actions
by the creator of a trade name to prevent its infringement, it has
been asserted by a few courts that they will not allow the public
to be deceived by one man's "passing off" his goods as those of
another.*' Jurisdiction seems to be exercised, however, not to
protect the public, but rather to protect a valuable interest (the
"goodwill" represented by the trade name) against infringe-
ment. 2  Relief has been granted in instances where there was
no likelihood of public deception, the sole injury being to the
plaintiff's monopoly of a trade name or trade-mark.2:  On the
other hand, it has been held that public deception without harm
2 1Levy v. Walker (1879) L. R. 10 Ch. 436 (confectioners); Thyime
v. Shove (1890) L. R. 45 Ch. 577 (assignee of business of baker could use
personal name of assignor, but not in such a way as to expose latter to
responsibility); Slater v. Slater (1903) 175 N. Y. 143, 67 N. E. 224 (man-
ufacturing business).
22 Bunn v. Guy (1803, K. B.) 4 East, 190; Aubin, v. Holt (1855, Ch.)
2 K. & J. 66.
23 Thynne v. Shove, supra, note 21.
24 Fi7uey Orchestra v. Finney's Famous Orchestra (1910) 161 Mich.
289, 292, 126 N. W. 198, 199; hd7ustrial Fin zec Corp. v. Community Fi-
"ance Co. (1923, C. C. A. 5th) 294 Fed. 870, 872. But see criticism of this
view, infra notes 25-27.
25 Schechter, Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marbrn
(1925) chs. 1, 7. Professor Chafee says in reviewing this book in (1025)
39 HARV. L. REV. 278: ". . . while relief in such cases as Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co. [hnfra note 26] is desirable under modern conditions,
the reviewer has hitherto felt that this necessitated a definite departure from
Mr. Schechter's book. . . . it seems right today to recognize a relation
between the owner and the trademark, analogous to, although not so ex-
tensive as the ownership of patents and copyrights." This reprezents a
considerable advance over the thinking on the subject as expressed in
(1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 624, 625, to the effect that "it is unfortunate
that the plaintiff in this ease has paid for something which the law does
not secure; but that cannot affect the decision." This was said in support
of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in A. Bourjois & Co. Inc.
v. Katzel, supra note 9, which was subsequently reversed in the Supreme
Court. See also Biddle, Good-Will (1875) 23 Au. L. REG. 649, 652; Rogers,
Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade (1913) 27 HAnv. L. REV. 139, 149.
26 A. Bourjois & Co. Inc. v. Katzel, supra note 9; Vogue Co. v. Thomp-
son-Hudson Co. (1924, C. C. A. 6th) 300 Fed. 509, noted in (1924) 34
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 213.
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to this "goodwill" is no ground for relief.27 In cases where the
plaintiff has made a fraudulent misstatement with respect to the
composition or qualities of his article, he retains the pivilege of
using a trade-mark, but is barred from enforcing his right that
others shall refrain from infringement. This is asserted as an
application of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands". 28
It is submitted that a sale of the "goodwill" of a personal serv-
ice enterprise, i.e., of the privileges and rights with respect to its
trade name, does not per se work such a fraud upon the public as
to make the power of assignment undesirable, nor should the
trade name become publici juris. But even if it should be con-
sidered in the nature of a fraud, the plaintiff's suggestion in the
instant case that the purchaser be required to use the name "suc-
cessor to the Flonzaley Quartet" would make the discussion
wholly academic; for then the very name would indicate that the
membership had changed and would negative any possibility of
fraud.
27 Webster. v. Webster (1791, Ch.) 3 Swans. 490, note; American Wash-
board Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co. (1900, C. C. A. 6th) 103 Fed. 281.
28 Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co. (1902) 187 U. S. 516, 23
Sup. Ct. 161; Perfection Mfg. Co. v. Coleman Silver's Co. (1921, C. 0. A.
7th) 270 Fed. 576; cf. General Baking Co. v. Gorman (1925, C. C. A. 1st)
3 Fed. (2d) 891; see Hopkins, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 445; Nims, Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks (2d ed. 1917) 670 dt seq.
